USA v. Jermel Lewis by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-16-2015 
USA v. Jermel Lewis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jermel Lewis" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 984. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/984 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         
      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2931 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JERMEL LEWIS, a/k/a STAR, a/k/a PR-STAR,  
a/k/a P 
 
                                        Jermel Lewis,  
 
  Appellant 
 
      
 
On appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-08-cr-00161-003) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
      
 
 
Argued on May 27, 2014 before Merits Panel 
Court Ordered Rehearing En Banc on November 25, 2014  
 Argued En Banc on February 19, 2015 
2 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, AMBRO,  
FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, 
HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, 
SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 16, 2015) 
 
Paul J. Hetznecker, Esquire  (Argued) 
1420 Walnut Street, Suite 911 
Philadelphia, PA   19102 
 
   Counsel for Appellant Jermel Lewis 
 
 
Robert A. Zauzmer, Esquire (Argued) 
Arlene D. Fisk, Esquire  
Office of United States Attorney  
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA   19106 
 
   Counsel for Appellee United States of  
   America 
 
 
Michael P. Addis, Esquire (Argued) 
J. Wesley Earnhardt, Esquire 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore 
825 Eighth Avenue 
Worldwide Plaza 
New York, NY   10019 
 
   Counsel for Amicus Amachi, Inc. 
3 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Jermel Lewis was sentenced for a crime with a seven-
year mandatory minimum—brandishing a firearm during and 
in relation to a crime of violence—notwithstanding the fact 
that a jury had not convicted him of that crime.  Instead, he 
had been convicted of the crime of using or carrying a firearm 
during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a 
five-year mandatory minimum.  Lewis was never even 
indicted for the crime of brandishing.  In Alleyne v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that this scenario, i.e., 
sentencing a defendant for an aggravated crime when he was 
indicted and tried only for a lesser crime, violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  133 S. Ct. 
2151, 2163-64 (2013).  Even though that constitutional issue 
is settled, we still must address the issue of whether the error 
that transpired in this case was harmless.  We conclude that 
the error was not harmless because it contributed to the 
sentence Lewis received.  Accordingly, we will vacate 
Lewis’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 
 
I.  Background 
Lewis and his codefendants Glorious Shavers and 
Andrew White (collectively, “Defendants”) committed an 
armed robbery of an unlicensed after-hours “speakeasy” in 
North Philadelphia on November 8, 2005.  Shavers and White 
were charged on March 20, 2008, with robbery in violation 
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of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and with using or 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  On July 10, 
2008, a superseding indictment charged Lewis with the same 
offenses and added attempted witness tampering charges 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) against all Defendants.  On 
August 20, 2009, a second superseding indictment added 
further witness tampering charges and a count of conspiracy 
to commit robbery against all Defendants.  Count three of the 
second superseding indictment—the only count at issue 
here—charged that Defendants “knowingly used and carried, 
and aided and abetted the use and carrying of, a firearm . . . 
during and in relation to a crime of violence.”  (App. 71.)  
The indictment did not include a count for brandishing a 
firearm. 
 
Defendants were tried in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania beginning on September 9, 
2009.  The District Court instructed the jury that Lewis was 
charged with “using and carrying a firearm during the crime 
of violence”; it did not instruct the jury on a brandishing 
offense.1  (App. 2019.)  The jury found all Defendants guilty 
of using or carrying a firearm and the Hobbs Act violations, 
but Lewis was acquitted of the witness tampering charges.  
Lewis was ultimately sentenced to a term of 132 months’ 
incarceration to be followed by five years of supervised 
release.  The 132 months consisted of 48 months’ 
incarceration on each of the two Hobbs Act counts, to run 
concurrently, and 84 months’ incarceration, the mandatory 
                                              
1 At trial, two victims of the robbery testified that the robbers 
threatened them with firearms; their testimony was consistent 
with the statutory definition of “brandishing.” 
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minimum term of imprisonment for brandishing a firearm, to 
run consecutively.  Lewis timely objected to being sentenced 
for brandishing a firearm because the jury found only that he 
had used or carried. 
 
Section 924(c)(1)(A) imposes differing mandatory 
minimum sentences depending upon whether the defendant 
“uses or carries,” “brandishe[s],” or “discharge[s]” a firearm 
during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime.  These are three “separate, aggravated 
offense[s].”  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162.  Indeed, they are in 
separate subparts of § 924(c)(1)(A).  Compare 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (uses or carries), with id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) 
(brandishes), with id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (discharges).  
Because Lewis was charged with and convicted of the “uses 
or carries” offense, but sentenced for the “brandishes” 
offense, he was sentenced for a crime for which he was 
neither charged nor convicted. 
 
Following sentencing, Defendants raised various 
issues on appeal.  Relevant here, we affirmed Lewis’s 
sentence.  United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 397 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  The Supreme Court granted Defendants’ petition 
for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded 
for further consideration in light of its decision in Alleyne, 
which had been decided after our ruling.  See Shavers v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2877 (2013).   
 
On remand, the Government continued to oppose 
Lewis’s Alleyne argument, urging that the error was harmless.  
On September 9, 2014, a divided panel of this Court affirmed, 
holding, “in light of the overwhelming and uncontroverted 
evidence in support of the brandishing element that, had the 
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jury been properly instructed on that element, it would have 
found that element beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “[a]ny 
resulting error was therefore harmless.”  United States v. 
Lewis, 766 F.3d 255, 271 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  On November 25, 2014, we vacated the 
panel opinion and subsequently reconsidered this appeal en 
banc.   
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Allegations of constitutional error at sentencing are subject to 
plenary review.  United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 452 
(3d Cir. 2001).  
 
III.  Discussion 
The parties do not agree on the framework that we 
should apply to this appeal.  Lewis urges that his Alleyne 
error constitutes one of the following: a structural error, a 
constructive amendment to the indictment, a presumptively 
prejudicial error, or a pure sentencing error under harmless-
error review.  The Government, conceding that there was an 
Alleyne error, urges us to apply harmless-error review, but 
would have us examine the trial record in addition to the 
sentence.  Because we will vacate based upon harmless-error 
review, which is the standard less favorable to Lewis, we 
need not address Lewis’s other arguments.  We need address 
only whether the error was a sentencing error or a trial error 
and then apply the appropriate standard, which in our case is 
the standard for sentencing errors.  We note, accordingly, that 
we do not opine as to the applicability of the alternative 
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standards more favorable to Lewis, the choice of which 
would present particularly thorny issues of law.2 
 
We begin by considering the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Alleyne, which held that brandishing a firearm was a 
separate, aggravated offense from using or carrying a firearm, 
and that the aggravated offense must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  We will then discuss the 
appropriate remedy here, in light of the Government’s 
argument that the error was harmless.   
 
A.  Alleyne 
The similarities between Alleyne and Lewis’s case are 
noteworthy.  Both Alleyne and Lewis were charged with 
using or carrying a firearm.  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.  
Each jury considered only whether Alleyne or Lewis had used 
or carried a firearm, not whether they had brandished one.  Id. 
at 2156.  Both Alleyne and Lewis were convicted of using or 
                                              
2 Our concurring colleagues assert that the failure to inform 
Lewis of the charge of brandishing in the indictment renders 
the error structural.  We are not so sure.  The indictment is not 
the focus of Lewis’s argument; he seeks resentencing, not a 
new indictment and retrial based on his having brandished the 
weapon.  The indictment and trial for gun possession did not 
violate his rights; his sentencing for a crime with a greater 
mandatory minimum did.  Given that no court has held that 
an Apprendi or Alleyne error is structural, we would be taking 
a bold step if we were to rule that the error here infected the 
entire trial process.  However, we need not decide this issue 
as the error here was certainly not harmless, and resentencing 
is, as the concurrence concedes, the appropriate remedy.   
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carrying.  Id.  Both Alleyne’s and Lewis’s presentence report 
recommended a seven-year sentence on the firearm count, in 
accordance with the mandatory minimum for brandishing.  Id.  
Both Alleyne and Lewis timely objected and contended that 
their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial had been violated 
because they were convicted of an offense with a five-year 
mandatory minimum, but sentenced as if they had been 
convicted of one with a seven-year mandatory minimum.  Id.  
Both district courts overruled the objection because Harris v. 
United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), foreclosed the argument.3  
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2156.   
 
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that if a defendant 
is convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence, but is instead sentenced for 
brandishing a firearm, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to be tried by a jury for the crime of brandishing a 
firearm has been violated.  Id. at 2163-64.  The Supreme 
Court overruled Harris and held that brandishing a firearm is 
a “separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the 
jury.”  Id. at 2162.  The Alleyne Court thus “vacate[d] the 
Fourth Circuit’s judgment with respect to Alleyne’s sentence 
on the § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and remand[ed] the case for 
resentencing consistent with the jury’s verdict.”  Id. at 2164.   
 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alleyne is based on 
earlier Supreme Court precedent, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
                                              
3 Harris had held that it did not violate the Fifth or Sixth 
Amendment for a judge to make a judicial finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant had 
brandished a firearm, thereby increasing the defendant’s 
mandatory minimum.  536 U.S. at 567-68. 
9 
 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), in which it determined that a jury 
must generally find facts that increase the penalty for a crime 
beyond the mandatory maximum.  In Alleyne, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the Apprendi rule for mandatory 
maximums also applies when the mandatory minimum is 
increased, as is the case for a brandishing charge; indeed, 
Alleyne is the logical extension of Apprendi.  See Alleyne, 133 
S. Ct. at 2163 (“[T]here is no basis in principle or logic to 
distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that 
increase the minimum . . . .”).  While an Apprendi error 
occurs when a judge, rather than a jury, finds a fact that 
increases the mandatory maximum, an Alleyne error occurs 
when a judge, rather than a jury, finds a fact that increases the 
mandatory minimum for a defendant.  In both Apprendi and 
Alleyne, the Supreme Court thus confirmed the fundamental 
right of a criminal defendant to have the jury, not the judge, 
find such facts. 
 
B.  Harmless Error 
Alleyne thus establishes that when a defendant is 
sentenced for brandishing but indicted, tried, and convicted of 
using or carrying, the defendant’s constitutional rights have 
been violated.  The Government urges, however, that this 
error can be harmless and correctly points out that the issue of 
harmless error was neither raised nor discussed in Alleyne.  
The Government also notes that the Supreme Court has 
“adopted the general rule that a constitutional error does not 
automatically require reversal of a conviction,” as “the Court 
has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range of errors 
and has recognized that most constitutional errors can be 
harmless.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991).  
Accordingly, we turn now to the issue of harmlessness.   
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The rule governing harmless error provides: “Any 
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect 
substantial rights must be disregarded.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(a).  For harmless-error review, “the over-arching 
consideration of Rule 52 is whether an error ‘affects 
substantial rights.’”  United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 
281 (3d Cir. 2001).  Harmless-error review “applies when the 
defendant has made a timely objection to an error,” as Lewis 
has in this case.4  Id.  “Though the harmless error analysis 
leaves room for certain convictions to stand, regardless of the 
presence of constitutional error at trial, it places a decidedly 
heavy burden on the Government to demonstrate that reversal 
is not warranted.”  United States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 438 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 
To begin, we note two different types of errors that we 
routinely review on appeal in a criminal case: trial errors and 
sentencing errors.  See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 326 
F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2003).  We must determine into which 
category Lewis’s Alleyne error falls.   
 
The error here was a sentencing error, as nothing was 
wrong with Lewis’s indictment or trial.  The indictment 
charged Lewis with an offense—using or carrying—and did 
not omit any elements of that charge.  At trial, the jury 
received the proper instructions for the using or carrying 
offense.  The jury properly entered a verdict finding Lewis 
guilty of that offense, so Lewis was properly convicted of that 
offense.  But, then, the District Court sentenced Lewis for the 
offense of brandishing.  As in Alleyne, this was the error.  See 
                                              
4 Otherwise, plain-error review applies.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b). 
11 
 
United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 294 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(“In Alleyne itself, the error was of the sentencing variety.”).  
We are not alone in reaching this conclusion, as the Courts of 
Appeals for both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have treated 
particular Apprendi errors as sentencing errors.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 409-10 (4th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091, 1095-97 (9th 
Cir. 2002).5  
 
This is not to say that all Alleyne or Apprendi errors 
are pure sentencing errors.  In United States v. Vazquez, 271 
F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc), we were confronted with 
both a trial error and a resulting sentencing error.  We noted 
in Vazquez that, for the particular Apprendi error in that case, 
“the sentencing error (imposing a sentence beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum) is inextricably intertwined 
with a trial error (failing to submit an element of the offense 
to the jury).”  Id. at 101.  The jury in Vazquez was never 
instructed on one of the elements of the offense, i.e., drug 
quantity, for which the defendant was indicted, tried, and 
                                              
5 We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has not applied Jordan consistently.  Compare Jordan, 291 
F.3d at 1097 (“We hold that the government cannot meet its 
burden under the harmless error standard when drug quantity 
is neither charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury 
beyond reasonable doubt, if the sentence received is greater 
than the combined maximum sentences for the indeterminate 
quantity offenses charged.”), with United States v. Salazar-
Lopez, 506 F.3d 748, 754-55 (9th Cir. 2007) (purporting to 
apply Jordan but considering whether the evidence was 
“overwhelming and uncontroverted”). 
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convicted—namely, conspiracy to possess and distribute 
more than five kilograms of cocaine.  See id. at 98 (“Vazquez 
was indicted and tried for conspiracy to possess and distribute 
more than 5 kilograms of cocaine . . . . [D]rug quantity was 
neither submitted to the jury nor reflected in its verdict.”).  
Thus, Vazquez involved a clear trial error: “failing to submit 
to the jury an element of an offense” for which the defendant 
was indicted and convicted.  Id. at 102.  Here, in contrast, the 
jury instructions discussed all the elements of the crime for 
which Lewis was indicted and convicted—i.e., using or 
carrying.  The District Court could have sentenced Lewis for 
using or carrying, as the jury found every element of that 
crime.  But it sentenced him for a different crime.  Thus, this 
case, like Alleyne, involves a pure sentencing error, whereas 
Vazquez involved a trial error.6 
                                              
6 This case is materially distinguishable from Neder, Johnson, 
and Vazquez.  In those three cases, the defendants were 
charged with the sentenced crime, but the jury was not 
instructed to find one of the elements of that crime.  See, e.g., 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999) (“The trial 
court, following existing law, ruled that the question of 
materiality was for the court, not the jury.”); Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464 (1997) (“[T]he District 
Judge instructed the jury that the element of materiality was a 
question for the judge to decide, and that he had determined 
that her statements were material.”); Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 98 
(“Vazquez was indicted and tried for conspiracy to possess 
and distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. . . . In Vazquez’s case, drug 
quantity was neither submitted to the jury nor reflected in its 
verdict.”).  To the extent that the concurrence and the dissent 
rely on those cases in concluding that the error here was a 
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Harmless-error review for a sentencing error turns on 
whether the error did or did not “contribute to the [sentence] 
obtained.”  Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Chapman v. California, 389 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).   In other words, harmless-error review 
for a sentencing error requires a determination of whether the 
error “would have made no difference to the sentence.”  
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319 (1991).  This analysis 
contrasts with the analysis appropriate for trial errors, which 
turns on whether it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error.”  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999).  
Because we are confronted here with a sentencing error, we 
do not conduct the analysis reserved for trial errors. 
 
There is a further reason that compels our rejection of 
the Government’s assertion that we should look back to the 
trial record in assessing harmless error when the mandatory 
maximum or minimum is at play.  Looking back to the trial 
record would run directly contrary to the essence of Apprendi 
and Alleyne.  The motivating principle behind Apprendi and 
Alleyne is that judges must not decide facts that change the 
mandatory maximum or minimum; juries must do so.  If we 
affirm because the evidence is overwhelming, then we are 
performing the very task that Apprendi and Alleyne instruct 
judges not to perform.  See, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 
(“Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime . . . 
must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable 
                                                                                                     
trial error, those cases do not support that position.  They do 
not address the situation where, as here, the defendant was 
sentenced for a crime for which he was neither indicted nor 
tried. 
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doubt.”); id. at 2162 (“When a finding of fact alters the 
legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact . . 
. must be submitted to the jury.”); id. (“Indeed, if a judge 
were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum 
sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment 
. . . .”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).7   
 
The Government relies heavily on United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), and Washington v. Recuenco, 
548 U.S. 212 (2006), in urging us to conduct the harmlessness 
inquiry reserved for trial errors and to examine the nature and 
quantum of the evidence introduced at trial in order to uphold 
the sentence.  However, these cases are distinguishable and 
do not advance the Government’s position.  In Cotton, the 
Supreme Court decided that an Apprendi error does not 
require reversal under plain-error review when the evidence 
that the defendant committed the offense at issue was 
overwhelming and uncontroverted.  Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633.  
                                              
7 We also note the Kafkaesque consequence of the 
Government’s position, which was made starkly apparent at 
oral argument: the Government conceded that “the logical 
outcome of [its] position” that judges should consider the 
evidence in the trial record is that, if a defendant were 
charged and convicted of manslaughter, but the judge were to 
find evidence of premeditation to be overwhelming and 
uncontroverted, a sentence for the aggravated offense of 
murder would be permissible.  (Oral Arg. 51:20, Feb. 19, 
2015.)   
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Cotton and Lewis’s case bear certain similarities—in each 
case, the indictment, the jury instructions, and the conviction 
all supported a lesser offense, yet the judge at sentencing 
subjected the defendant to the sentencing range applicable for 
an aggravated offense.  See id. at 627-29.  It follows that 
Cotton, like Lewis’s case, involves a pure sentencing error.  
But Cotton involved plain error because the defendant failed 
to timely object to the error, id. at 634, not harmless error as 
is the case here.  The crucial consideration in Cotton was that, 
because the evidence at trial was overwhelming and 
uncontroverted, “the error did not seriously affect the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”8  Id. at 632-33.  Here, because Lewis’s case 
does not involve review for plain error, the issue of whether 
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings is not before us.  See 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) 
(noting that this is a question for plain-error review); see also 
Jordan, 291 F.3d at 1096 n.7 (holding that Cotton “does not 
control nor aid our analysis” because “that case was analyzed 
under plain error, not harmless error”); Mackins, 315 F.3d at 
409 (distinguishing Cotton because the integrity of judicial 
proceedings step of plain-error review “has no application 
when a defendant has objected in the trial court and so 
preserved his contention for appellate review”).9  
                                              
8 Crucially, the Cotton Court did not address whether the 
presence of overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence at 
trial was a consideration for the “substantial rights” stage of 
the plain-error inquiry.  535 U.S. at 632. 
 
9 We do not find the Court for Appeals for the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Confredo persuasive 
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Accordingly, Cotton does not dictate the analysis or result 
here. 
Recuenco is also off-point.  In Recuenco, a jury found 
that the defendant had committed an assault with a “deadly 
weapon.”  Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 215.  The judge sentenced 
the defendant pursuant to an enhancement for using a 
“firearm,” which is a type of “deadly weapon.”  Id.  However, 
the problem was that the jury did not specifically find that the 
defendant committed an assault with a “firearm,” just that he 
had committed an assault with a “deadly weapon.”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court held that the “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing 
factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, 
is not structural error.”  Id. at 222.  Importantly, at no point 
did the Supreme Court explain what harmless-error review 
should consist of.  Instead, it merely “remand[ed] the case for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion.”  Id.  
Thus, Recuenco provides no support for the Government’s 
assertion that we should consider the evidence in the trial 
record here.10  
                                                                                                     
because it fails to recognize this distinction.  See 528 F.3d 
143, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has ruled [in 
Cotton] that an Apprendi violation concerning an omission 
from an indictment is not noticeable as plain error where the 
evidence is overwhelming that the grand jury would have 
found the fact at issue.  We think the same analysis should 
apply to harmless error.” (citation omitted)). 
10 Both the concurrence and the dissent struggle unnecessarily 
and incorrectly with the test for harmlessness.  The dissent’s 
inquiry into the evidence is wrongheaded, as the error 
occurred at sentencing, and thus, the Government must prove 
that the sentence would have been no different had the error 
not occurred.  Cotton’s concern with the integrity of judicial 
17 
 
Here, we are presented with a pure sentencing error 
and thus must ask whether the Alleyne error in this case 
contributed to Lewis’s sentence.  As we explained supra, this 
inquiry takes the form of asking whether Lewis’s sentence 
would have been different had he been sentenced for using or 
carrying, rather than brandishing.  See Parker, 498 U.S. at 
319 (explaining the inquiry as whether the error “would have 
made no difference to the sentence”).  Obviously, Lewis’s 
sentence would have been different: Lewis received 84 
months for brandishing—the seven-year mandatory 
minimum—whereas the mandatory minimum for using or 
carrying is two years less.  Therefore, Lewis has been 
sentenced to an extra two years as a result of this Alleyne 
error.  The Government bears the “decidedly heavy burden” 
as to harmlessness, see Waller, 654 F.3d at 438, and it does 
not and cannot contend that it “would have made no 
difference to the sentence” if Lewis had been sentenced for 
using or carrying, instead of for brandishing.11   
                                                                                                     
proceedings and its resulting consideration of the evidence 
has no place here: the integrity of judicial proceedings is the 
last prong of the plain-error test, and it is absent from the 
harmless-error test.  The concurrence proceeds from the 
vantage point of the purportedly defective indictment.  This, 
too, is flawed.  Nothing was wrong with Lewis’s indictment: 
the error was in sentencing Lewis using the mandatory 
minimum applicable to a crime more serious than the crime 
of conviction.   
11 There may be a case where the sentencing court makes it 
clear that it is not sentencing the defendant based on the 
mandatory minimum.  In such a case, we could conclude that 
the Alleyne error did not impact the sentence.  See United 
States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (“For 
18 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s sentence and remand for resentencing.   
                                                                                                     
the error to be harmless, it must be clear that the error did not 
affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.”).  
If the Government meets its heavy burden to show that the 
error would have made no difference to the sentence—i.e., 
had the defendant been sentenced for the crime for which he 
was convicted, his sentence would have been the same—then 
we may affirm under harmless-error review.  However, we 
would remand for resentencing unless we are certain that the 
error made no difference to the sentence. 
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United States v. Lewis, No. 10-2931 
SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring, joined by McKEE, Chief 
Judge, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 Jermel Lewis was charged with and convicted of using 
or carrying a firearm, but was eventually sentenced on the 
basis of a different, aggravated crime.  Conviction of the 
aggravated crime would have required proof of an element 
unnecessary to a using or carrying offense:  that Lewis had 
brandished a firearm.  Lewis’s indictment did not charge him 
with brandishing, nor did the jury find that he had committed 
that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yet Lewis was 
subjected to the enhanced mandatory minimum sentence 
required for brandishing.  I agree with the majority that this 
error demands resentencing; the new sentence should be 
based solely on the crime with which Lewis was actually 
charged and for which he was convicted.  But I would hold 
that this error was structural and therefore reversible if 
properly preserved.  Structural errors do not require a court to 
inquire into whether the error was harmless. 
I. 
 Analysis of the nature of the error here begins with 
determining whether sentencing a defendant for an uncharged 
crime is a “pure sentencing error” as the majority describes it, 
or instead is an error that is inextricable from the contours of 
the indictment.  Our previous en banc decision in United 
States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001), provides the 
lens through which the error in this case must be viewed.  
There we considered a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
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530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which the defendant was charged and 
tried for conspiracy to possess and distribute more than five 
kilograms of cocaine, a quantity sufficient to warrant an 
enhanced sentence.  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 98.  But the jury 
was not asked to find drug quantity.  Id.  Nevertheless, the 
district court sentenced the defendant to 292 months’ 
incarceration—over four years more than the applicable 
statutory maximum for a conviction without quantity—after 
finding by a preponderance that the defendant had been 
“involved with”1 nearly two kilograms of cocaine.  Id. at 98–
99.  While the case was on direct appeal, the Supreme Court 
decided Apprendi.  Id. at 99.  Applying Apprendi 
retroactively, we said the failure to submit drug quantity to 
the jury yet imposing an enhanced sentence for quantity was 
“not just a sentencing error but also a trial error” because  
the sentencing error (imposing a sentence 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum) is 
inextricably intertwined with a trial error 
(failing to submit an element of the offense to 
the jury). On the one hand, the trial error exists 
only because of the sentencing error. On the 
other hand, the sentencing error cannot occur 
without the trial error. 
Id. at 101.  Thus, we chose not to view the error in Vazquez as 
a pure sentencing error because “the realities concerning the 
nature of Apprendi violations” required a different result.  Id.   
                                                 
1 The evidence at trial showed that the defendant had given 
991 grams of powder cocaine and 859 grams of crack cocaine 
to a co-conspirator for storage.  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 97. 
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 This was also “more consonant” with the approaches 
taken in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).   Vazquez, 271 
F.3d at 102.  Both Neder and Johnson involved the trial 
court’s failure to submit a required element of a defendant’s 
conviction to the jury.2  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18–19; Johnson, 
520 U.S. at 470.  We reasoned that because the errors in 
Neder and Johnson were “trial error[s] result[ing] in a 
constitutional defect,” the failure to submit an element to the 
jury resulting in a sentence violating Apprendi must also 
constitute both trial and sentencing error.  Vazquez, 271 F.3d 
at 102. 
 A similar series of events tainted the proceedings here.  
The indictment charged Lewis with using and carrying a 
firearm, and the District Court properly instructed the jury as 
to that charge.  Yet the District Court applied the enhanced 
mandatory minimum for brandishing.  The omission of 
brandishing from the jury instructions and the resulting error 
in sentencing for brandishing stemmed from the 
Government’s decision not to charge brandishing in the 
indictment.  Similarly, the indictment was lacking only 
because the District Court sentenced Lewis for brandishing.  
Although prosecutorial discretion permitted the Government 
to charge Lewis for a less significant crime than the evidence 
might support, see United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 
306 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In our criminal justice system, if the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed and that the accused committed it, the decision 
                                                 
2 Notably, neither Neder nor Johnson involved indictment 
omissions. 
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whether or not to prosecute and what charges to file generally 
rests within the prosecutor’s broad discretion.”), the 
Government’s decision not to charge brandishing gained 
constitutional significance when the District Court sentenced 
Lewis for the uncharged brandishing offense. 
 The majority concludes that “[t]he error here was a 
sentencing error, as nothing was wrong with Lewis’s 
indictment or trial.”  But the same could have been said in 
Vazquez:  The instructions to the jury were sufficient to 
support a conviction and sentence for a lesser-included 
offense that did not require proof of drug quantity, and the 
sentencing court erred by imposing a sentence greater than 
that reflected in the instructions.  Indeed, we characterized the 
sequence of events in Vazquez as a combined “trial and 
sentencing error” despite there being nothing incorrect about 
instructing the jury and securing a conviction on a lesser-
included offense, as opposed to the aggravated crime charged 
in the indictment.  See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 
705, 717 (1989) (Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure “suggests that a lesser included offense instruction 
is available in equal measure to the defense and to the 
prosecution”); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 
(1973) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to an instruction on a 
lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury 
rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit 
him of the greater.”); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 
F.3d 196, 207 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming conviction for lesser-
included offense under plain-error review where jury was 
instructed only as to aggravated offense).   Accordingly, that 
the indictment here was initially error-free does not control 
whether we must nevertheless consider the charges Lewis 
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faced to assess the implications of his erroneous sentence for 
brandishing. 
 Indeed, as in Vazquez, the realities of the Alleyne error 
here support the view that the District Court’s error was not 
limited merely to sentencing.  The Government from the 
outset alleged facts consistent with brandishing.  The second 
superseding indictment described Lewis’s and his co-
defendants’ overt acts in relation to the Government’s 
conspiracy count as follows: 
Defendants Glorious Shavers, Andrew White, 
and Jermel Lewis burst through the front door 
of the Speakeasy armed with handguns and a 
shotgun, announced a robbery, forced 
customers and employees to the floor, 
threatened to shoot them, herded the victims 
into the basement and again forced them onto 
the floor, and stole money, wallets and cell 
phones. 
This allegation was incorporated by reference into the count 
charging Lewis under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  
But that count charged Lewis only with “knowingly us[ing] 
and carr[ying], and aid[ing] and abett[ing] the use and 
carrying of, a firearm.”  The Government’s decision not to 
charge Lewis with brandishing under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), despite alleging conduct clearly consistent 
with brandishing in the operative count, transformed what 
would have been a proper sentence for brandishing into 
constitutional error.  
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 The Government’s prosecution of this case may be 
understandable given that this case was charged, tried, and 
sentenced while Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), 
was still good law.  Until overruled by Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), Harris approved seeking an 
enhanced sentence for brandishing without submitting that 
element to the jury given that only a mandatory minimum 
was affected.  See Harris, 536 U.S. at 556.  Nevertheless, 
submitting an essential element affecting the applicable 
mandatory minimum only to the court at sentencing is 
impermissible after Alleyne.3  And because the sentencing 
error of which Lewis complains exists only because of the 
Government’s decision not to charge brandishing in the 
indictment, we should consider the proceeding as a whole, 
from the indictment through sentencing, to determine whether 
the error was structural. 
II. 
 The Supreme Court has taken a categorical approach 
in distinguishing structural errors from those errors subject to 
review for harmlessness.  Most constitutional errors can be 
harmless, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991), 
but if an error is structural, it is “per se prejudicial” and 
“lead[s] to [an] automatic reversal” if properly preserved.4  
                                                 
3 Similarly, only after Apprendi did it become clear that the 
sentence in Vazquez was erroneous. 
4 If the error was not properly preserved, under plain-error 
review we may affirm a judgment even if there is a structural 
error that affects substantial rights.  See United States v. 
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002) (declining to resolve 
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Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103.  Several factors inform whether an 
error is structural.  Structural errors “necessarily render a 
criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle 
for determining guilt or innocence.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141 
(quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 9).  They also “‘defy analysis by 
harmless-error standards’ because they ‘affec[t] the 
framework within which the trial proceeds,’ and are not 
‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’”  United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49 (2006) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10).  Thus, an error “with 
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and 
indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error.’”  
Id. at 150 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 
(1993)).  Errors can also be structural if harmlessness is 
irrelevant to the right violated, as in the case of denials of the 
right to self-representation.  Id. at 149 n.4 (citing McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)). 
 Few errors are more significant to the proceedings that 
follow than an indictment that fails to inform a defendant of 
                                                                                                             
whether omission of drug quantity from indictment was 
structural but affirming conviction on plain-error review); 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997) 
(declining to resolve whether omission of element from jury 
instructions was structural but affirming conviction on plain-
error review).  However, the Supreme Court has not yet 
resolved whether a structural error automatically affects the 
defendant’s substantial rights for the purposes of that review.  
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140 (2009); see also 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993). 
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the charges against him and the possible punishment he faces.  
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be 
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  Accordingly, a defendant has the 
“substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an 
indictment returned by a grand jury.”  Stirone v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).  This guarantee is “a basic right 
of criminal defendants.”  United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 
154 (3d Cir. 2002).  Thus, “a court cannot permit a defendant 
to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment 
against him.”  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 
(3d Cir. 2010); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 
106 (1979) (“To uphold a conviction on a charge that was 
neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial 
offends most basic notions of due process.”). 
 The Sixth Amendment also provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI.  This right is violated when an indictment 
“does not state the essential elements of the crime.”  United 
States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Russell 
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 761 (1962)).  “A person’s 
right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an 
opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in 
court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence.”  In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).  Prosecuting a defendant 
for an aggravated crime when the indictment charges only a 
lesser crime thus violates both the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (“[U]nder the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice 
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and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact 
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum 
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 
(1999))); see also Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2157 (facts that 
aggravate “the prescribed range of sentences to which a 
defendant is exposed” are “elements and must be submitted to 
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 Sentencing a defendant for a crime that was not 
charged in the indictment renders the criminal proceedings 
fundamentally unfair.  An indictment that charges a different 
crime than the one for which a defendant is sentenced does 
not merely affect the criminal proceeding, it fundamentally 
alters that proceeding.  Put another way, the charging 
instrument is “the framework within which the trial 
proceeds,” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148 (quoting 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 148), and forms the basis for the 
Government’s proof, the accused’s defense, and the trial 
court’s rulings.  Indeed, whether a defendant decides to plead 
guilty or instead exercises his right to trial by jury may 
depend on the charges he faces and his potential punishment.  
Thus, failing to notify a defendant of the crime of which he is 
accused “infect[s] the entire trial process,” Neder, 527 U.S. at 
8 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993)), 
and undermines any confidence that the sentence imposed 
reflects a just outcome.  
 Further, inquiry into whether an error of this nature 
was harmless is inherently unreliable.  See Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. at 149 n.4 (holding error was structural because of 
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“the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error”).  Would 
Lewis have pled guilty if he had known of the applicable 
mandatory minimum for brandishing, in hopes that his 
acceptance of responsibility would result in leniency at 
sentencing on the Hobbs Act counts?  Or perhaps he would 
have chosen to cooperate with law enforcement against his 
co-conspirators to gain the Government’s support for a 
sentence below the mandatory minimum, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  Would he have 
been successful in these efforts to reduce his sentence if he 
had undertaken them?  Assuming Lewis still chose to go to 
trial, how would his defense have changed?  Would he have 
sought to develop evidence rebutting a charge of brandishing?  
What would that evidence have been?  What if Lewis’s 
counsel chose not to attack the Government’s proof that 
Lewis used or carried a firearm, but would have put on a case 
against weak proof of brandishing?  How might the 
Government’s or Lewis’s counsel’s presentations of the case 
changed?  Would witnesses have changed their testimony in 
response to questions probing brandishing?  Would these 
differences have impacted the jury?  All parties to a criminal 
proceeding, including the judge, the jury, the defendant, 
defense counsel, witnesses, and prosecutors, are guided by the 
charges in the indictment.  And if that indictment charges a 
crime different than the one for which a defendant is 
sentenced, determining “what might have been” is an exercise 
in rank speculation.  
 In my view, the Supreme Court’s rationale in United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez dictates the outcome here.  There, 
the Supreme Court held that the violation of a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice was structural 
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error.  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.  In doing so, the 
Supreme Court observed that a different attorney might have 
pursued “different strategies with regard to investigation and 
discovery, development of the theory of defense, selection of 
the jury, presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness 
examination and jury argument.”  Id. at 150.  Further, the 
choice of attorney “affects[s] whether and on what terms the 
defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bargains, or 
decides instead to go to trial.”  Id.  Thus, “[i]t is impossible to 
know what different choices the rejected counsel would have 
made, and then to quantify the impact of those different 
choices on the outcome of the proceedings.”  Id.  So too when 
an indictment charges a lesser crime than the one for which a 
defendant is eventually sentenced.  Assessing the effects of 
the flawed indictment here is “a speculative inquiry into what 
might have occurred in an alternate universe” and is a far cry 
from the “quantitative[] assess[ment] in the context of other 
evidence presented” that defines harmless-error analysis.  Id. 
at 148, 150 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08).   
 In an effort to demonstrate that the error here was not 
harmless, the majority also distinguishes the Supreme Court 
precedent on which the Government relies, including United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), and  Washington v. 
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006).  As the majority correctly 
notes, Cotton involved plain error and did not address 
whether the type of error here was structural.  See 535 U.S. at 
632–33 (declining to resolve “whether respondents satisfy 
[the substantial rights] element of the plain-error inquiry”).5  
                                                 
5 The majority also suggests that “Cotton, like Lewis’s case, 
involves a pure sentencing error.”  But Cotton did not opine 
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Further, apart from the majority’s analysis, Recuenco is not 
applicable because the Supreme Court expressly declined to 
consider whether an error under Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 212 (2004),6 in the charging instrument was structural 
error.  See Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220 n.3 (noting that 
defendant sought to “characteriz[e] this as a case of charging 
error, rather than of judicial factfinding” but rejecting that 
distinction “[b]ecause the Supreme Court of Washington 
treated the error as one of the latter type”); id. at 223 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause the Court does not 
address the strongest argument in respondent’s favor—
namely, that Blakely errors are structural because they deprive 
criminal defendants of sufficient notice regarding the charges 
they must defend against, this decision will have a limited 
impact on other cases.” (citation omitted)).  Indeed, after 
Recuenco, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the very 
question presented in this case, but resolved that case on 
alternative grounds.  United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 
U.S. 102, 103–04 (2007) (granting certiorari “to answer the 
question whether the omission of an element of a criminal 
                                                                                                             
on whether it is a pure sentencing error or instead something 
more when a defendant is sentenced for an aggravated crime 
but the indictment, jury instructions, and conviction support 
only a lesser offense. 
6 Blakely, applying Apprendi, “clarif[ied] ‘that the “statutory 
maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a 
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’”  Lloyd v. 
United States, 407 F.3d 608, 612 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303). 
13 
 
offense from a federal indictment can constitute harmless 
error” but reversing “without reaching the harmless-error 
issue”).  Accordingly, Cotton and Recuenco hold little 
persuasive value as to whether the Alleyne error here was 
structural.7  
 The majority suggests that its opinion does not 
foreclose a holding that the omission of an element from an 
indictment in violation of Alleyne is structural.  Instead, the 
majority emphasizes that left open is whether “the alternative 
standards more favorable to Lewis,” including whether the 
error is structural, might apply in a case like this.  But by 
limiting its harmless-error analysis to the record at Lewis’s 
sentencing, I believe the majority implicitly rejects a 
conclusion that the error here could be structural.  It is 
difficult to conceive of a pure sentencing error as “affect[ing] 
the framework within which the trial proceeds,” rendering a 
trial “fundamentally unfair,” or meeting any of the other 
recognized criteria for structural error.  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. at 148–49 & n.4 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–
10).  Indeed, the majority undercuts its expressed restraint by 
                                                 
7 Some of our sister circuits, relying on cases like Recuenco 
and Cotton, have decided this issue differently.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 94–95 (1st Cir. 
2013); United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d 748, 753–54 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Baptiste, 309 F.3d 274, 277–
78 (5th Cir. 2002).  For the reasons stated above and by the 
majority, neither Recuenco nor Cotton support a holding that 
the error here was not structural.  Further, none of these cases 
cited Gonzalez-Lopez or considered its rationale. 
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acknowledging that even if the same Alleyne error is made in 
a future case—i.e., where neither the indictment, jury 
instructions, nor conviction reflect the crime for which a 
defendant is sentenced—we may nevertheless affirm the 
sentence imposed “where the sentencing court makes it clear 
that it is not sentencing the defendant based on the mandatory 
minimum.”  In my view, doing so would ratify a 
fundamentally unsound principle:  that a defendant may be 
sentenced based on a crime for which he was never indicted 
nor convicted, and the evidence of which he was never 
afforded the opportunity to rebut. 
 Finally, the harmless-error analysis that the majority 
suggests is applicable here is inherently flawed.  As 
envisioned by the majority, in order to be harmless, the record 
must demonstrate clearly that the sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence absent the error.  United 
States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).  Put 
another way, errors of the kind made here would require a 
showing that the District Court would have imposed the same 
sentence even if the defendant were charged and convicted of 
a lesser crime than the one for which punishment was 
imposed.  Query whether a sentencing court’s reasoning that 
it would impose the same sentence regardless of the crime 
charged violates 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)’s mandate that the 
sentencing court consider “the nature and circumstances of 
the offense” when choosing an appropriate sentence.  See 
United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district 
court’s analysis must demonstrate “meaningful consideration 
of the relevant sentencing factors”).  So although the majority 
indicates that harmless-error review is applicable, in practice 
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the kind of error here would rarely, if ever, warrant our 
approval even under a harmless-error analysis. 
 
 
III. 
 For these reasons, I would hold that a sentencing 
court’s imposition of a sentence for an aggravated crime that 
was not charged in a defendant’s indictment constitutes 
structural error.  On that basis, I would vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and remand for resentencing based on the 
crime of which Lewis was actually convicted. 
 1 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom CHAGARES 
and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, join. 
 
 The plurality finds that Jermel Lewis’s substantial 
rights were affected when he was sentenced to a seven-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a weapon 
during a crime of violence, despite undisputed and 
overwhelming testimony that he pointed a gun at many 
people during a robbery. Though what occurred below was 
error, in my view, for the reasons explained in Judge Smith’s 
concurring opinion, the error occurred both at trial and at 
 2 
 
sentencing.1 So, upon a review of the uncontroverted 
evidence presented to the grand and petit juries, I would hold 
that the error was harmless.  
                                              
1 The plurality bases its ultimate decision on the 
rationale introduced by an amicus curiae. This result causes 
me concern because it allows defendants to take the tack most 
expedient at any point in their appeal, regardless of what was 
argued earlier. Our jurisprudence dictates that we should be 
hesitant to consider amici’s arguments that were not squarely 
raised by a party below, absent extraordinary circumstances 
involving a pure question of law, which are not present here. 
N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 
382-83 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (“‘Although an amicus brief can be 
helpful in elaborating issues properly presented by the parties, 
it is normally not a method for injecting new issues into an 
appeal, at least in cases where the parties are competently 
represented by the parties.’”); Webb v. City of Phila., 562 
F.3d 256, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We are not presented with 
a pure question of law here, nor are we faced with exceptional 
circumstances. We do not reach the merits of Webb’s 
constitutional claims.”). Moreover, an argument can be made 
that Lewis explicitly waived his ability to counter the 
Government’s argument that any error was harmless. Far 
from neglecting to raise the issue, Lewis forcefully disavowed 
this argument, for instance, by beginning his argument to a 
three-judge panel of this Court by emphasizing “I’m arguing 
that harmless error doesn’t apply.” See also Lewis Br. at 15 
(noting on the first page of the argument section, that “the 
doctrine of ‘harmless error’ has no application”). However, 
since the Government raised harmless error post-Alleyne, 
arguably the question of harmless error at sentencing was 
before us, so I will not couch my opposition on waiver. 
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 I agree with the plurality that this error is not structural 
and therefore is reviewed for harmless error or plain error 
under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because the Government has conceded that Lewis objected at 
sentencing to his seven-year mandatory minimum sentence, 
we review for harmlessness.2 Because in my view Lewis 
would have received the same sentence had there been no 
error—that is, had the grand jury been asked to charge 
brandishing and had that charge been presented to the jury—
the error under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 
                                              
 2 I note that our review for harmless error is 
precipitated by a major concession by the Government—a 
concession that appears to have little basis in what actually 
occurred in the District Court. Lewis, in his first brief, 
adopted his co-defendant’s statement that “[d]efense counsel 
did not object to a consecutive sentence of seven years’ 
imprisonment for brandishing a firearm.” Brief for Appellant 
Glorious Shavers at *5, United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 
363 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2790), 2011 WL 2179274; see 
Brief for Appellant Jermel Lewis at *xi, Lewis, 693 F.3d 363 
(No. 10-2931), 2011 WL 2322206 (“Appellant rests upon the 
arguments presented by co-defendant, Glorious Shavers’ brief 
on this issue . . . .”). Years later, in a supplemental letter brief, 
the Government conceded that Lewis objected to the 
brandishing element at sentencing. It noted then that it gave 
Lewis the considerable benefit of the doubt in doing so. More 
than giving Lewis the benefit of the doubt, the Government 
rewrote history. Read in context, Lewis’s comment at 
sentencing had nothing to do with objecting to the seven-year 
mandatory minimum. Absent that concession, we would 
apply plain error review to this case, and the outcome there 
would be obvious—Lewis would lose.  
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(2013), is harmless and we should affirm the District Court’s 
sentence. 
Alleyne held that “any fact that increases the 
mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted 
to the jury.” Id. at 2155. It followed in the footsteps of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held that, “[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Because Alleyne is an extension of 
Apprendi, we have held that they are to be implemented 
similarly. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210, 212-
13 (3d Cir. 2014). If an objection to an Alleyne or Apprendi 
error is made, we review for harmless error. 
 An error is harmless when it does not affect a 
defendant’s substantial rights. In the context of combined trial 
and sentencing error, that is the case when “it appears beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.” Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). To 
determine if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error in Lewis’s case did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained, we first identify the error and then evaluate what the 
impact would be on Lewis had the error not occurred. 
 In identifying the error, the key point is that when 
Lewis’s indictment, trial, and sentencing took place, the law 
binding the District Court was Harris v. United States, 536 
U.S. 545 (2002). Harris dictated that “[b]asing a 2-year 
increase in the defendant’s minimum sentence on a judicial 
finding of brandishing does not evade the requirements of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. . . . That factor need not be 
alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 568. Thus, in this case, the 
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grand jury properly did not allege brandishing in the 
indictment. The jury was properly not asked to find 
brandishing. The judge properly found the brandishing 
enhancement at sentencing by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The District Court did not err at the time. Rather, 
those errors only sprung into being because Lewis’s case was 
still on direct appeal when Alleyne was decided, overturning 
the procedures dictated by Harris.   
 This understanding of the interplay between Lewis’s 
case and the changing Supreme Court precedent helps to 
pinpoint the errors with regards to Lewis’s indictment and 
trial. Alleyne made it improper to have a grand jury 
indictment omit the brandishing element and made it 
improper to withhold that element from the petit jury. If both 
of these events had taken place, then the District Court would 
have been correct in sentencing Lewis to the enhanced 
mandatory minimum. Because the error in part occurred at 
the indictment stage, we first review the evidence and 
testimony presented to the grand jury to determine whether it 
would have included the brandishing element in its 
indictment. If we determine that it would have, we then ask 
whether, given the evidence and testimony introduced at trial, 
the petit jury would have convicted Lewis of the enhanced 
offense. If so, we ask whether the mandatory minimum 
sentence imposed on Lewis would have been the same. If the 
answer to all three questions is “yes,” the errors of which 
Lewis complains are harmless, for correcting them would not 
change Lewis’s sentence—that is, would not affect his 
substantial rights. 
 This is the essence of the harmless error review and of 
the substantial rights inquiry in this context: Given the quality 
and quantum of the evidence presented at the relevant stage, 
would the outcome for the defendant have been different? At 
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base, this is the same inquiry faced by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), albeit there in 
the plain error context. Plain error review and harmless error 
review are nearly identical, with the exceptions that plain 
error review (1) requires consideration of whether the error 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings and (2) shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant. See United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 99-100 
(3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 In Cotton, a district court at sentencing made a finding 
of drug quantity neither alleged in the indictment nor found 
by the jury, consistent with practice at the time. 535 U.S. at 
628. This finding was not challenged in the district court. Id. 
While the case was pending appeal, the Supreme Court 
decided Apprendi, which made the district court’s quantity 
finding erroneous. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed for 
plain error and found that there was an error that seriously 
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that because “[t]he evidence that the conspiracy involved at 
least 50 grams of cocaine base was overwhelming and 
essentially uncontroverted,” id. at 633 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), the error did not seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. “Surely 
the grand jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, 
would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 
50 grams of cocaine base,” id., as the drug quantity was 
referred to in other parts of the indictment.  
 This formulation—that the fairness and integrity of the 
proceeding were not affected because the outcome would not 
have been different—is precisely how we are to examine 
substantial rights: Whether the outcome would have been 
different for the defendant. Thus, the Supreme Court has 
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drawn a direct line between the “substantial rights” inquiry 
and the “fairness/integrity/public reputation” inquiry in 
criminal cases with these types of Apprendi/Alleyne errors. 
The relevant inquiry in Lewis’s case is therefore 
indistinguishable from the underlying question the Supreme 
Court had to answer in Cotton: Was there sufficient evidence 
of the missing element such that the substantive outcome 
would have been the same? 
 That equivalence dictates the result here because the 
evidence that Lewis brandished a firearm was overwhelming 
and, more than being essentially uncontroverted, was in fact 
completely uncontroverted. Brian Anderson, a witness at trial 
who was a patron at the speakeasy on the night of the 
robbery, identified Lewis as “a heavier light-skinned guy, 
[who] had another type of handgun—I think it was black—in 
his hand.” App. at 876. He stated that this person “stood in 
the doorway with the gun on everybody,” id., and positively 
identified Lewis at trial. Alberto Vazquez, another patron at 
the time of the robbery, identified Lewis at trial as “the 
general, the leader,” who “had a black 9-millimeter or .45 
caliber. . . . It was a black automatic weapon. He pulled it out 
of his right side pocket, of the hood pocket.” App. at 968-69. 
Vazquez further testified that Lewis’s gun was “pointed at 
[Vazquez] and pointed at several other people.” App. at 970. 
At one point Lewis “pulled [Vazquez’s] shirt up, [and] put the 
gun to [his] stomach.” App. at 971. Vazquez identified Lewis 
as the defendant who robbed him that night.  
 Lewis presented no evidence to rebut the 
Government’s showing at trial. The testimony from Anderson 
and Vazquez clearly demonstrated that Lewis went beyond 
mere “use” of a firearm and instead brandished it as per the 
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4) (defining 
“brandishing” as “display[ing] all or part of the firearm, or 
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otherwise mak[ing] the presence of the firearm known to 
another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless 
of whether the firearm is directly visible to that person”). This 
evidence was undisputed. The grand jury certainly would 
have found the missing element; indeed, the second count of 
the indictment (one of the Hobbs Act counts) explicitly 
charged that Lewis and his co-defendants “point[ed] firearms 
at the customers and employees, order[ed] them to the floor, 
and threaten[ed] to shoot them.” App. at 70. And the petit 
jury heard evidence, described above, that Lewis pointed the 
gun at people and held it at their bodies. Lewis introduced no 
contrary evidence. Therefore, these errors would not have 
changed the outcome at trial and, according to the logic of 
Cotton, they do not affect Lewis’s substantial rights. 
 Let there be no mistake: This is not a case where 
Lewis merely declined to introduce contrary testimony. 
Although at the time the brandishing element did not need to 
be found by the jury, Lewis and his counsel certainly knew 
that it would be considered as a sentencing enhancement by 
the judge after a verdict was returned. Lewis thus had every 
incentive to call witnesses who could provide evidence that 
he had not brandished a gun. He chose not to do so—
presumably because there were no such witnesses who could 
testify on his behalf as to this fact. The fact that he at no 
point—at trial or at sentencing—introduced contrary evidence 
is fatal to his contention that the judge’s brandishing finding 
affected his substantial rights. Therefore, the District Court’s 
Alleyne error is harmless and I would affirm Lewis’s 
sentence. 
 I dissent. 
